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Outlines of Criminal Law. By Courtney Stanhope Kenney, LL.D.,
Reader in English Law, University of Cambridge. Revised
and Adapted for American Scholars by James H. Webb, In-
structor in Criminal Law and Procedure in the Law Depart-
ment of Yale University. N. Y. The MacMillan Co., 1907.
Until the publication of this volume, there has been no short
work on Criminal Law especially adapted to the use of American
law students. Dr. Kenney's book, published in 19o2, was based
upon lectures given by him for more than twenty years at Cam-
bridge. It stated, in a fresh and interesting way, so much of Eng-
lish criminal law as an English university student or an English
country magistrate needs to know, in order to acquaint himself
with its fundamental principles and rules, not forgetting to em-
phasize such as are of universal application. Like all English
law books, it was saturated with statute law. Mr. Webb has
weeded out a good deal of this, introduced not a little from purely
American sources, and recast the work into a homogeneous whole,
not showing upon its face how much is from his pen and how
much from that of Dr. Kenney. The latter observes of
Stephen's edition of Blackstone (p. 4) that it was one in which the
Commentaries were reconstructed rather than edited. A not dis-
similar service has been performed, and well performed for him
by Mr. Webb.
The English common law of crime was the parent of ours, but
we have somewhat expanded it in applying it to the conditions of
a new country, provided in the beginning with but meager sta-
tute-books. Thus Dr. Kenney's remark (pp. 6, 23) that until
made such by Act of Parliament, it was no crime in England to
kill a horse or cow, represents a stage of social development which
Americans passed very early in their judicial history.
The peculiar value of the original work was its clear setting
forth of the subject is a scholarly and philosophic way. This
feature has been fully preserved in Mr. Webb's recension. It is
an intelligible book to the general reader, who has had no pro-
fessional education in law.
Dr. Kenney is no sentimentalist in his theory of punishments.
He vindicates them mainly as -deterrent, although showing some
sympathy (p. 3o) with Cousin's epigram that punishment is not
just because it deters, but deters because it is felt to be just.
One gets occasionally an illuminating glimpse of the greater
directness and stronger movement of the English criminal trial,
as compared with ours. The Ju, ge takes a hand in the case,
from the start to the finish, in a --. '- that our Constitutions or
usages render rare. Thus a trial "ted as occurring in 19ox,
when Mr. Justice Bigham "advised" chdt jury to acquit a women
of murder, who had deliberate -- drowned two of her children,
though she had never showed any other symptom of a disordered
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mind, and had declared that she thought "it was the best thing
she could do for them." (p. 5 x).
The chapters on evidence are of particular merit. Our very
artificial rules and the reasons for them are both clearly explained.
Dr. Kenney accepts as a maxim Omniapresumuntur rite et solen-
niter esse acta, without the customary prefix of Ex diuturnitate
tempris'(p. 319)- It may be doubted if in this abbreviated form
it can be considered as established in American courts.
It has evidently been the aim of Mr. Webb to make no
changes in the text not necessary to prevent misconceptions by
an American reader. This rule was, no doubt, the right one, but
occasionally may have been pushed too far. Thus, he has re-
tained without qualification (p. 360) the statement (supported by
ample English authority) that a witness, who is not a party, can-
not be compelled to produce his title-deeds for inspection. There
are, to say the least, strong reasons for the position that this im-
munity is bound up with the peculiar English system of real
estate conveyancing, and would not be respected in a country
where all land titles are normally matters of public record.
The proof reading has been in general well done, though we
notice (pp. xvii, 3o6) the leading case of United States v. Arjona
given as United States v. Arizona. S. A. B.
APerffu de lEvolution Juridiue du Mariage. II. Bspagne. By
Emile Stocquart. Brussels, Oscar Lamberty, 1907. pp. 283.
31 francs.
The first part of this work was reviewed in the Yale Law
Journal in 19o5 (Vol. XIV, 357). The author now takes up the
course of the law of marriage in Spain. Its original Roman foun-
dation is first set out, with considerable detail ;-monogamy but
side by side with it, concubinage, both equally legitimate forms
of union. The father of the concubine, or he who had the patria
.potestas over her, must give his consent to the latter contract, and
by the same right could terminate it at will (pp. 39, 65). Chris-
tianity, under Constantine, withdrew the sanction of the law for
concubinage (p. 73).
The invasion of the Goths made, Dr. Stocquart maintains,
less of economic and social changes than has often been thought,
because the lands which they seiz.d belonged to but a few pro-
prietors. Spain was than held by a handful of grandees, each
with a little army of slaves. One of them fed four thousand per-
sons through the Winter on the products of his estate. The Bar-
barians took from most of these land holders two-thirds of their
possessions; but this still left them rich (p. 99). In the fifth
century the term nobles meant the rich rather than the well-
born, and they were found largely in the cities, where the pun-
ciples of civil liberty were for long better enforced than in the
rest of Europe.
German institutions had little influence in Spain. The name
German is the Latin rendering of Herman, that is war-man (p.
ro8), and it was only in that character that the Roman people
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knew the German people. In the seventh century, the Roman
and Barbarian laws were merged into one system by the Visi-
goths and the territoriality of law made the rule (p. 217). Re-
strictions on marriage now became greater. Theodosius had
made it a capital crime for first cousins to marry. Now the mar-
riage of the children of first cousins was forbidden (p. 222).
A new influence soon came in with the Arabs. The Koran
ranged itself with the old Roman law in allowing divorce at the
will of the husband (p. 264). But the Moor in Spain was ready
to acknowledge woman's share in the world's work, outside of
the household. Many were government clerks. In one quarter
of Cordova there were seventy girls employed as copyists (p.
265). After the final expulsion or subjugation of the Moors,
those who remained were governed by their own personal law, as
regards marriage (p. 278).
All Spanish institutions of government and society, down to
their bull-fights, and including their spirit of architecture, bore
and still bear a closer resemblance to what belonged to Rome,
than those of the rest of modern Europe. There was, however,
a strong local color in the various provinces, and a diverse cus-
tomary law (the Fueros), the treatment of which Dr. Stocquart
reserves for another volume, in which he will also trace the
Spanish history of marriage to the present time, with its growing
conflict between Church and State.
Like its predecessor, this volume is the work of a ready writer
of wide reading, who has the art of stating plainly and in good
order what others of perhaps greater scholarship but inferior
literary ability have left in a certain degree of obscurity or con-
fusion. S. E. B.
.Federal Rate Bill, Immunity Act and Negligence Law of 79o6.
Annotated by F. N. Judson. T. H. Flood & Co., Chicago.
Conference of Counsel for Railroad Companies in Louisville. Ky.,
Sept., x9o6. Report of Committee on Employers' Liability
Act.
By passing the Rate Bill, the Immunity Act and the Negli-
gence Law in the Fifty-ninth Congress, the Federal Government
greatly extended the scope of its control over corporations
engaged in interstate commerce and abrogated some of the funda-
mental principles of the common law. Whether or not these
acts will stand the test to which they will undoubtedly be put by
the corporations which are affected by these statutes is a matter
of great interest and of some doubt.
At the present time the Employers' Liability Act, or "Federal
Negligence Law" as it is sometimes called, seems to create more
excitement in the camp of the railroad corporations than either
the Rate Bill or the Immunity Act. The Immunity Act simply
declares in statutory form the principle enunciated by the court
in U. S. v. Armour, 142 Fed. 8o8, to the effect that immunity
from prosecution granted in cases in which self incriminating
evidence is produced before the Interstate Commerce Commission
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extends "only to a natural person who, in obedience to a sub-
poena, gives testimony under oath or produces evidence docu-
mentary or otherwise, under oath." In other words, the Act
does not include in its scope the corporation or artificial person.
The salutory effect of this provision is obvious. The Commission
is enabled to secure evidence, otherwise unobtainable, and at the
same time the guilty party does not escape all punishment. The
immunity is extended to the agents and officers of the corpora-
tion, but not to the artificial entity itself. One would not expect
this matter to create the same amount of interest which the more
radical Negligence Law has aroused.
Bitter and harsh have been the assaults on this piece of legis-
lation. Some foresee the destruction of our dual system of
government, while others see an opportunity to give a crushing
blow to the overzealous supporters of increased federal control of
interstate commerce. What the outcome will be is doubtful.
Already two federal courts have declared that the act is uncon-
stitutional. Judge Evans of the District Court of Kentucky and
Judge McCall of the District Court of Tennessee have decided
that Congress in undertaking to legislate in this manner, has trans-
gressed the limits of its powers.
Judge McCall declared in substance that "Congress has no
power to define the liability of interstate carriers for torts result-
ing in injury to their employees unless it has, in the first instance,
prescribed rules governing the conduct of such carriers towards
their employees, and it is only for a breach of those rules that it
may fix civil liability."
"As the Employers' Liability Act does not prescribe rules
governing the conduct of common carriers towards their em-
ployees, but merely attempts to define their liability for negli-
gence, it is not a regulation of commerce among the states, and
therefore, is unconstitutional."
"If the Act regulates commerce at all, it regulates intrastate
commerce, and as Congress has no power to regulate intrastate
commerce the entire Act must be declared void, it being im-
possible to separate that part of the act which relates to intra-
state commerce from that part which relates to interstate com-
merce."
Practically the same grounds are taken by Judge Evans in the
earlier case and they are the grounds upon which the opponents
of the act rely in their attacks. Just what view the United States
Supreme Court will take of the matter is, of course, unknown.
The decision will probably be handed down sometime in April.
Some of the interesting features of the Negligence Law are
as follows:
The strict common law doctrine of contributory negligence
is abrogated, and the rule adopted is substantially the same as
that which exists in admiralty. The statute provides that
"contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery where his
(employee's) contributory negligence was slight, and that of the
employer was gross in comparison." This rule does not entirely
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relieve the injured party who contributes to the cause of his injury
from all liability. Yet the strict and rigid rule which bars a
recovery at common law where the injured party is guilty of
contributory negligence is no longer in force in this class of cases
in the Federal Courts.
The above brings us to a consideration of another and no
less interesting feature of the act, that the doctrine of compari-
tive negligence is adopted. The statute provides that "the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the
amount of n.gligence attributable to such employee." This doc-
trine is not a part of the common law and is generally considered
a dangerous one. While the principle of equitable adjustment
which the rule contains is unquestionably praiseworthy, it is most
pernicious in practice. The act provides that "all questions of neg-
ligence shall be for the jury." To turn a jury loose on questions
involving such nicety and precisiun invites havoc and seriously
impairs the usefulness of the jury system.
It is one thing to determine whether or not a party has
departed from the legal standard of care required of him and
quite another and most difficult thing to find the degree of
departure by each party, to determine whether the defendant is
guilty of gross negligence and the plaintiff of slight negligence.
The mere difficulty of administering a rule is, perhaps, never a
sufficient excuse for not adopting it, if it is a just one; but where
that difficulty renders the rule impracticable, any other excuse is
uncalled for. The Supreme Court of Illinois clearly stated this
view when it said that "the definition of gross negligence itself
proves that it is not intended to be the subject of comparsion.
It is I the wont of slight diligence.' Slight negligence is ' the
wont of great diligence.'"
The fellow servant rule is also abrogated. The corporations
coming within the purview of the act are liable to any of
their employees for all damages resulting from the negligence of
any officer, agent or employee. This is not the place to discuss
the merits of the fellow servant doctrine. It is sufficient to note
the effect of the provision.
The texts of these acts annotated by F. N. Judson and the
report of the committee appointed at the Conference of Counsel
for Railroad Companies on the questions arising under the Em-
ployers' Liability Act are of great value to the student of these
new laws. The latter work is very exhaustive and presents in the
strongest light the position which the railroads have assumed in
combating the extension of federal control over interstate com-
merce.
